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KlAUS KRIPPENDORFF 
Introduction 
• 
l n this paper I intend to examine several espistemoiogical difficulties one quite naturally encounters within 
traditional semiotics, especially when trying to 
apply it to. design (industrial design and product 
semantics1 in particular). 
Whenever a discipline encounters intellectual 
challenges that it cannot respond to in terms of its 
own standard practices, it can either exorcise them 
and withdraw into a smaller domain of increasingly 
refined but narrow applications, or it can expand its 
conceptual horizon and embrace these challenges 
with the prospect of thereby losing its own identity. 
Transcending 
Semiotics 
TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING 
DESIGN FOR UNDERSTANDING 
I prefer the latter. My plan therefore is to remove 
those assumptions that lead to untenable semiotic 
. practices, practices that prevent semiotics from par-
ticipating in solving contemporary social problems, 
and develop from what remains an alternative ap-
proach to the study of meaning in the broadest 
sense, an approach that can more readily cope with 
certain intellectual challenges emerging from a vari-
ety of scholarly and practical endeavors. 
Seeking to understand meaning generally and the 
meaning of designed objects particularly, we are 
invariably lead to a point at which we have to make 
a critical choice between two alternative paths of 
understanding (things). The well-trodden path is 
called objectivism. I will call the other construc-
tivism. Without denying that there are various 
shades of objectivism and various shades of con-
structivism2, just as there also are many variations 
in approaches to semiotics, I do believe the two 
paths are epistemologically incommensurable and 
lead to significantly different social practices. 
Roughly, objectivism entails a commitment to the 
belief in a reality that possesses observer- or culture-
independent structures, objects, codes and laws 
waiting to be discovered, enciphered and described. 
For objectivists, humans are plagued by observa-
tional biases, inadequacies, illusions and metaphysi-
cal beliefs that scientific observers seek to overcome 
in order to obtain increasingly accurate accounts of 
the one universe that exists outside of them. 
Objective knowledge is representative of what exists 
and the criterion for accepting a proposition as 
(empirically) valid is truth by correspondence.' 
I am suggesting that the mainstream of semiotic 
scholarship is deeply rooted in the kind of objec-
tivism just described. This already is evident in its 
foundational concept: the sign. For something to 
be a sign, there must be a (physically existing) sign-
vehicle and what it carries, its meaning, a proposi-
tion and what it is about, a symbol and what it 
stands for, or an artifact and what it expresses. Not 
only is the essential connection between the two 
domains presumed discoverable, identifiable, 
describable and, hence, residing outside the 
observing semiotician, the product of scientific 
practice, here semiotic theory, is conceived descrip-
tive of an objective reality as well. I suspect this 
commitment to objectivism runs so deep that many 
semiotically informed readers of this paper may not 
find anything objectionable in this view. Talting 
language to refer to something that exists independ-
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ently of it seems so obviously true. Oddly, it is the 
practice of designing meaningful objects that might 
constitute a sufficiently strong challenge of main-
stream semiotics' received ontology. 
Consfl·uctivism, the way I see it, takes reality as 
residing neither somewhere outside or independent 
of its human observer, of which objectivists are 
unshakably convinced, nor inside an imagining 
human mind, as solipsists hold true, but as arising 
within the circular process of perception and action 
or of conceiving and malting things, in other 
words, in practice or in social practice when other 
humans are as well involved. 
Consider walking on a beach. We feel the sand 
between our toes and several inches beneath our 
feet and soon come to know properties we could 
not see before we stepped on (or into) it: the 
softness, the warmth, the sound it makes walking. 
What objectivists must describe as a reflection from 
the yellow spectrum of the sunlight becomes for the 
constructivist meaningful and alive thought 
individual and multisensory participation. If we 
cut us once on a piece of glass buried beneath the 
sand's surface, we are inclined to see glass every-
where and walk accordingly. Understanding has 
nothing to do with the physics of sensation. It 
penetrates the visual surfaces of something deep 
into its interior. It creates a reality on which we 
act, a reality that becomes manifest in practice. 
Consider the notion of a gift. We give all kinds of 
things all the time,'whether as part of the role we 
are assuming, in exchange for money or in the 
expectation of a future benefit. However, what 
constitutes a gift is carefully negotiated between 
givers, recipients and third parties or judges not to 
be confused with a bribe, an insult, a burden, an 
obligation or aid. Objectivists will have a hard time 
to find the references for what appears to be a 
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meaningful gift. Constructivists would consider 
the notion of a gift as a social construction that 
arises out of and in turn participates in particular 
social practices (of giving things). 
Key to the constructivist approach is not an 
objective reality but understanding. An axiom of 
constructivism is that, excepting purely autono-
mous biological functions and involuntary behav-
ior, individuals cannot see physical stimuli, much 
less respond td them. They do not act on informa-
tion from the outside, not even on affordances 
designed into artifacts by others, but they do 
behave according to their own understanding of 
their own experiences, whether this concerns the 
highly personal construction of sand on the beach 
or the social construction of a gift. Taking "under-
standing" literally suggests that it stands beneath or 
grounds reality in the social practice of people 
living together. Social practice simply becomes an 
unfolding of the constructions in the understanding 
Figure I. 
of participating individuals. Understanding is far 
from static. We might approach a new product 
with curiosity but always handle it as a vatiation from 
what we already know and what we want it to be. 
Radical constructivists moreover apply the proposi-
tions they make about others to themselves and 
consequently see their very own probing into 
meaning as a social practice arising in their own un-
derstanding critically involving the construction of 
similarly capable others. 
Leaving this introduction behind, I will now 
explore the two alternatives. Let me first proceed 
along the well known road of mainstream and, as I 
claim, objectivst semiotics until some of its entail-
ments come in sight and then retract to proceed on 
the path less travelled, sketching the conceptual 
milestones I see there in passing. Figure I serves as 
a map of this effort. 
Map oftheTwo Paths 
Understanding = designing meaningful things 
; 
; ; 
; ; 
; ; 
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Dualism 
Paradoxes/contradictions 
Lack of self-reflexion 
The usual road of mainstream 
semiotics' objectivism 
based on the fam~us semiotic triangle whose corners are occupied by sign-vehicle, designatum and interpre-
tant, by utterance, meaning and concept or by relat-
ed tri-partitions favoured by individual semioti-
cians, Morris' division of the semioticians' labor 
into syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Morris, 
1938) is widely accepted as evident in encyclopedias 
and dictionaries (e.g. Sebeok, 1986). Let me state 
their definitions for the sake of laying the ground: 
8 Syntax is the study of the relations between sign-
vehicles (to which some physical existence is 
ascribed), 
8 Semantics is the study of the relations between 
sign-vehicles and their designata, particularly the 
objects which they may or do denote, their 
referents, 
8 Pragmatics is the study of the relations between 
signs and their users and includes in its domain all 
the psychological, biological, and sociological 
phenomena that occur in the functioning of signs. 
Although these definitions appear obvious and 
innocent, I am suggesting that they exemplifY a 
vocabulary that drives semioticians, possibly quite 
unknowingly, along the objectivist road. Notice in 
these definitions (1) that they presume an embed-
ded hierarchy whose base rests upon the materiality 
of sign-vehicles that become signs by virtue of their 
non-physical, grammatical, semantic and pragmatic 
ways of functioning; (2) that the various relations 
being studied here, whether these are based on 
resemblances, natural laws, or conventions, are 
presumed to actually exist independent of describ-
ing them, descriptions being viewed as representa-
tive or a reflection of the relations as observed, and 
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(3) that the semioticians offering descriptive ac-
counts of their observations in these three areas of 
inquiry, their own discourse, their intellectual con-
cerns and historical or cultural backgrounds, no-
where enters the semiotic project. Like gods, semi-
oticians keep themselves outside their object of in-
terest. This indeed is a textbook example of objec-
tivism at work. 
Allow me to reframe the three areas of semiotic 
studies to make the nature of the implied objec-
tivism more transparent. Evidently: 
8 Symax is the description of a reality in which 
humans do not exist or are not allowed to enter. 
Compositions, forms, systems and texts are 
presumed to have their own syntax which semioti-
cians study and discover, whatever their origin, 
basis or purpose may be. Geometry, grammar, 
composition rules and mathematics are typical 
languages for syntactical descriptions of sign-
vehicles, but none provide in them a place for their 
human creators, users or observers:' 
8 Semantics is the description of a reality in which 
all humans (within a community) are the same and 
can rl1erefore be ignored. This is already manifest 
in accepting claims of the rather common form 
"something means or refers to something other 
than itself' or "something is a symbol or a substi-
tute for something else," either of which may be 
said to be part of an existing code. Notwithstand-
ing the acknowledgement that some of the seman-
tic relations or codes are established by convention, 
legislated by authority or, in the case of symptoms, 
as having to be discovered in nature and learned to 
be acted upon, describing them without references 
to human cognition presupposes that semantic 
relations or codes exist independent of their 
creators and users and outside of whoever accounts 
for them. This objectification divorces meanings 
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from the very "somebody" that Charles S. Peirce, in 
his definition of sign, made responsible for some-
thing to be meaningful. Except for confining 
semantic descriptions to a speech community or 
culture, humans turn out to be irrelevant in such 
objectivist accounts of meaning. Finally: 
CD Pragmatics is the description of how humans 
respond to a reality that is the same for everyone 
(within a community). Studying "the uses of signs" 
presumes knowing the signs whose use is being in-
vestigated. Inquiring into "the interpretation of a 
tex( presumes the existence of a text that is knowa~ 
ble and independent of its interpretation. By pack-
ing into pragmatics all the biological, psychological, 
sociological and political aspects of signs presumes a 
non-biological, non-psychological, non-sociological 
and non-political realm of existence in which signs, 
their syntax and semantics reside unaffected by 
their use. Objectivist pragmatics (which almost is a 
contradiction in terms) here admits individual vari-
ation, whether due to biases, incompetencies, mis-
understandings or interests, but always in response 
to or in the use of a common reality, a universe of 
shared signs, symbols or meanings that are the same 
for everybody. -How else could one establish bi-
ases, incompetencies and misunderstandings but by 
reference to a standard reality, a known universe 
common to all? 
One may not like this characterization of semiotics, 
but I suggest it fairly accurately describes main-
stream semiotics' epistemological assumptions as 
manifest in its vocabulary and linguistic practices. 
Let me elaborate on five entailments of objectivist 
semiotics, its intellectual imperialism, its predispo-
sition for standardization, it dualism, its paradoxes 
and inconsistencies, and its lack of self-reference. 
An example might illustrate where this road 
takes us. 
2 8 
Its intellectual imperialism. In a recent and 
unfortunately rather naive article in Fonn, Uri 
Friedlander (1989), a designer by trade and proba-
bly quite unaware of the epistemology he was 
tampering with, tried to drag product semantics 
along the very objectivist road it had deviated from 
by accounting for the meaning of artifacts without 
any concern for either individ-
ual cognition or the social 
practices of users or designers. 
To support his contention, 
that product semantics was 
already known during the 
stone age, he presented several 
images of artifacts. Two 
examples are reproduced in 
figure 2 respectively captioned 
"bronze handle" of a door with 
the comment I( the lion as 
symbol of protection. Roman 
100-300 AD" and "cosmetic 
spoon. The lion and the eagle 
as guardian angel of 
beauty ... Egypt 1250 BC." 
Notwithstanding his rather careless confusion of 
ages, one is compelled to ask: How does 
Friedlander know what these artifacts meant? How 
can he possibly speak for what people had in mind 
thousands of years ago? Does he have any evidence 
about how the artifact now called "cosmetic spoon" 
was perceived, talked about and used by ancient 
Egyptians? Were there guardian angels? Was the 
owner of the house with such a bronze handle really 
so insecure that he or she needed the image of a 
lion for protection? And did it work? 
Let me propose that any assertion of what some-
thing means speaks foremost for the speaker, here a 
1989 Friedlander. A statement of what something 
means to someone else is far more difficult to 
substantiate. If we happen to find something 
interesting and meaningful to warrant joint 
attention or if we see it as a sign of something else, 
then this takes place in our own contemporary 
culture, in our own living language and in the 
presence of our own cognition. 01,1r own and 
always contemporary perception provides us with 
no indication of how the ancient maker or users of 
an artifact saw what we see or was conscious of 
what we now take for granted. As a discipline, 
semiotics is about a hundred years old. Its name is 
said to have been coined by John Locke in 16905 
and the awareness of a relationship between sound 
and meaning has been traced no further than to 
Plato's dialogues (Cratylus). No doubt, people 
talked long before they knew they did, but there is 
no evidence that the creators of the cave paintings 
oflascaux, for a stone age example, had any 
notions resembling ours, least of all of product 
semantics. The claim that one's own perceptions 
equal those of everyone else, past and future, here 
and everywhere is an ethnocentrism, or better still, 
an intellectual imperialism we ought not to tolerate 
in our midst and certainly not clothe in scientific 
terms. 
I an1 suggesting that the intellectual imperialism in 
the above is the consequence of a vocabulary that 
drives mainstream semioticians to confuse their 
discourse and their way of seeing with the objectivi-
ty of the things seen or talked about and constructs 
a single, objective and coherent universe in which 
humans either play no role (in the case of syntax) or 
are so alike (in the case of objectivist semantics) 
that their nature does not matter. The imperialists' 
language here becomes privileged, universal and 
transparent. This imperialism does not kill people 
or capture territory (although such could become 
its consequence). Minimally, it is an act of disre-
spect for the cognitive autonomy of other individu-
als, their ability to make their own sense of their 
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own world and maximally, it is an act of oppressing 
the views of other cultures, ethnic minorities and 
the less privileged, ruling their identity out of 
existence to the benefit of the semioticians' own 
position of authority. 
Since there is no easy test for the sharing of 
perceptions among contemporaries and much less 
across cultures and ages) an objectivist discourse on 
meaning that generates assertions like "the lion is a 
symbol of protection" (without qualifYing for 
whom, when and in what circumstances), implying 
that everyone must be able to see what so obviously 
and objectively "exists", claims unquestionable he-
gemony over the discourses of others. The 
publication of Friedlander's therewith expressed 
views implicitly supports the imperialist claims of 
mainstream semiotics. Even modern market 
researchers would discredit themselves by not 
qualifYing accounts of the meanings of products. 
Its predisposition for standardization, If I 
were to see a door with a ring held in place by what 
resembles to me a lion's teeth, I could invent 
numerous equally plausible explanations ranging 
from the reputed strength of a lion's teeth (the con-
viction "a lion will not surrender his prey" maybe 
an analogue to "the ring can't be pulled out") to 
that it might be the original home of a traveller, 
hunter or lion tamer. Collectively we might come 
up with many more explanations than I can 
imagine and there is no guarantee that what we can 
come up with has anything to do with why an 
ancient craftsman made the door handle in that 
image, why the house's tenant put it on his or her 
door and what it meant to those having to handle 
it. In view of such possible variations of meanings, 
the objectivist road Friedlander is taking here by 
asserting, with the authority of an expert, that the 
lion is a symbol of protection blinds him and his 
readers from recognizing cultural diversity. 
9 
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The semiotic view of communication as exchanging 
signs chosen from a common repertoire or as using 
a common code for translating sign-vehicles into 
their corresponding designata (or representations 
thereof) elevates the objectivists' disrespect for 
cultural diversity and individual autonomy to a 
theoretically motivated social norm. In this view, 
only the sharing of meanings, only the invariability 
of encoding and decoding processes, only the same-
ness of the senders' and receivers' processing 
equipment makes communication and by implica-
tion society possible. Accordingly, if the image of a 
lion would not mean the same for everyone it could 
not induce the fear necessary to deter thieves or 
offer protection against disasters, just as a message 
that does not point everyone to the same referent 
could not have generalizable effects. In this 
objectivist view, the standardization of signs, their 
meanings and their use, is a prerequisite of under-
standing, communication and social orderliness. 
It is therefore not surprising that Friedlander is 
driven to the very same conclusion, calling for the 
search and use by designers of"culture-independent 
symbols," implying that they could exist every-
where and for everyone alike. In the same vein, the 
call for papers for the design section a recent 
congress on semiotics' of laments the lack of 
uniformity in human-product relationships and 
warns against a new "Babylonian confusion'' in the 
design of computer interfaces, especially in the 
icons used for manipulating computer screens. 
Undoubtedly, there occasionally are good reasons 
for inventing and institutionally enforcing stand-
ardized symbol systems, for example, public traffic 
signs, whose ability to coordinate human behavior 
benefits all participants. But such examples are few. 
In design, standardization has always supported 
mass production for mass consumers and enabled 
mass control. In contrast, whether this is due to an 
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increasing material abundance, to the availability of 
new technologies, to widespread democratization of 
culture or to post-modern attitudes, standardization 
for the sake of theory is increasingly seen as 
oppressive. For example, personal computers were 
developed with the explicit intent to counter what 
was then perceived as a tendency towards centrali-
zation of intelligence. This new technology was 
envisioned as cheap and hence affordable by many, 
able to undermine hierarchies by supporting net-
working, negotiation and communication, and 
freely configurable, thus enabling individuals to 
organize their own worlds according to their own 
conceptions and desires. The computer revolution 
we now experience attests to the value of this indi-
vidualization and the importance of a motivation 
that derives from interacting with a technology that 
is engaging, playful and fun and from the ability to 
create meanings and construct individual worlds in 
the process. Standardization of user interfaces, the 
rational submission to predefined functionalities 
and the conformity of use, has driven even large 
scale computer manufacturers out of business. I am 
suggesting that a discipline, a theory or a discourse 
whose normative implications are contradicted by 
so many contemporary experiences becomes non-
viable in the long run. 
Its inherent dualism. The Cartesian dualism is 
fundamental to all kinds of objectivisms and 
naturally at home in mainstream semiotics. This is 
evident in the foundational distinction between the 
world of signs, symbols and linguistic expressions 
and the world of unlabeled objects and observer-
independently existing physical events. The former 
possess the ability to mean, refer to, substitute for, 
represent or describe the latter, but not the other 
way around. The two worlds are construed as 
being governed by different laws, the semiotic rules 
or codes, and the natural (prototypically physical 
but also including biological, psychological and 
some would even add sociological) laws. The 
semiotic dualism replicates the stereotypical 
distinction between culture and nature or between 
mind and matter and is sometimes rationalized in 
philosophical realism. 
This dualism is not a mere philosophical issue. In 
the design of industrial products, for example, it 
assigns product meanings and product functionali-
ties or materialities to distinct phenomenal domains 
an thereby promotes a particularly suspect design 
practice. It makes semiotic practitioners, like 
Friedlander, to talk about the meaning of a door 
handle as if the door handle were an object that 
could exist without meaning (for anyone) and to 
which some meaning could mysteriously be 
attached (by its designer). Accordingly, it becomes 
natural for semioticians to look for that additional 
feature in the inessential aspects of form, the image 
of a lion's head, for example, implying that without 
some such feature the door handle would have to 
be without meaning or meaningless and moreover, 
that the perceiving and being able to handle what 
the word "door handle" designates has nothing to 
do with its meaning. 
Helen Karmasin7, representing a marketing view of 
product semantics, is guided by the very same 
dualist conceptions, conceiving meaning as a value 
adding feature of consumer products. I am far 
from denying what I see as her main point, that 
designers' awareness of semantics can improve 
products' marketability and use. I merely wish to 
point out that the dualism mainstream semiotics 
supports encourages the design of products that are 
thought to acquire values and meanings by (I) 
imitating (representing or symbolizin/Y something else 
that has inherently nothing to do with them, like a 
telephone in the shape of a duck decoy, (2) adding 
symbols of value from another semantic domain, 
like non-functional bottoms, dials and frequency 
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indicators to an electronic device to make it appear 
more sophisticated, valuable or in style than it is, 
(3) substituting cheaper materials while maintaining 
traditionally valued appearances, like pressing Nava-
ho jewelery out of plastic, or (4) associating them 
with prestigious individuals, designers, prominent 
figures that the users are made to believe they could 
emulate. 
Instead of seeking to understand how something 
comes to be meaningful in users' minds and to 
enable this process through informed product 
design, the dualism implied in the semiotic 
vocabulary, conveniently embraced by the rhetoric 
of advertisement, creates a make belief world of 
deceptive symbolisms behind which lack of 
understanding, alienation and frustration necessari-
ly lingers. 
Its absurdities and contradictions. For one 
example, the dualism just assessed for its practical 
implications also leads to strange contradictions. If 
one insists on distinguishing between a realm in 
which natural laws govern physical events inde-
pendent of human observation and a realm 
consisting of semiotic phenomena, signs, symbols 
and linguistic expressions which seemingly are the 
products of human consciousness, how can 
mainstream semioticians justify studying their 
empirical domain from the very same removed and 
outsider's perspective that physicists employ to 
inquire into theirs? How can one simultaneously 
claim semiosis to be a phenomenon of human 
consciousness and yet describe it as if humans 
either did not exist, have nothing to do with it or 
variously use what is considered same for everyone? 
Doesn't this kind of semiotics conceptually under-
mine its own premise. 
Consider another example. Ulrich Neisser (1976), 
after conducting numerous experiments, concluded 
1 
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that we do not see things but meanings. James 
Gibson (1979, 1982), before him said much the 
same by suggesting that we do not percei':e objects 
but affordances. Gestalt psychologists build their 
approach on the experimentally verifiable experi-
ences that we cannot identify absolute sounds but 
contrasts between them, melodies for example, that 
we recognize figures only against a ground, in other 
words, that an observer-independent physics of sen-
sory impressions has little to say about what and 
how we see. !manuel Kant, long ago, concluded: 
things as such are constitutionally inaccessible to 
us. Obviously, one cannot simultaneously claim 
that we only see meanings and that an object 
(which we would have to be able to distinguish and 
identify as such without its meaning) has (or con-
veys) meanings without either running into serious 
contradictions or claiming that semioticians are in 
the privileged position of god-like observers 
superior to everyone else. One is led to ask: what 
would happen to a semiotics in which the sign-
vehicles, stimuli or artifacts on one edge of the sem-
iotic triangle are taken to be as I think they are con-
stitutively inaccessible to human observers? 
Unicorns exemplify another class of semiotic 
oddities. Unicorns, we know, do not exist. When 
we see one we therefore must deny its status both as 
real and as a pictorial representation of something 
real. This lack of reference leads us to describe 
unicorns with a syntactical language that cannot 
but bring to bear on its description the kind of 
experiences we have with the animals unicorns 
remind as of, thus reintroducing the representation-
al attributes just denied, A Hlm shot in the stage set 
of a totally imaginary town is equally paradoxical. 
The camera shoots something that is at once real 
and imaginary, an original fake. Computer 
generated images that represent nothing outside 
that computer's own mode of operation pose 
similar problems to semiotics and artifacts or 
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objects of design can be seen in the same semioti-
cally paradoxical state. Saying that something, a 
unicorn) Gotham City> a spoon or a stone, for that 
matter, refers to itself is just an effort to save a 
misguiding objectivism by attributing actor status 
to objects. Things, like unicorns, are what they 
mean to us in our experience neither because a 
theory tells us which experiences are legitimate 
(even so semiotics may just try to do this in its own 
domain) nor because the things have the intention 
to represent themselves in ways they do. 
Its Inability of self-reflexlon. Let me conclude 
my criticism by pointing to what might underlie all 
four of the difficulties mentioned: mainstream 
semioticians see the object of semiotic analysis, the 
world of semiosis, as existing independent and 
outside of their describing it. This sharp distinc-
tion between the semiosis as observed by a detached 
semiotidan and what semioticians do in their own 
work prevents semioticians from entering their own 
empirical domain and makes their own theories 
and empirical accounts of semiotic phenomena 
immune to semiotic considerations. It also enables 
them to deny responsibility for the very semiosis 
their semiotic accounts may set in motion in those 
addressed, in the phenomena being described, 
including in their own cognition. In short, 
mainstream semiotics is non-reflexive if not 
authoritarian in consequence (in the sense of both 
being unquestionably above and not caring for the 
cognition of those affected by it). In stating this so 
bluntly, I do not imply unethical intentions or 
devious conduct, but, as I suggested earlier, that it 
is the semiotic conceptualizations, vocabulary and 
discourse that keeps semioticians on the well paved 
road of a self-limiting objectivism. 
A brief example may add to what I already said. A 
challenging paper by Antje Flade8 revealed gender 
differences in what a home means to its inhabit-
ants. It found (please note that "finding" implies 
that it was there before it was discovered and 
unaffected by the act of describing it) that women 
see in their home a place they identifY with, a place 
of human contact, a place where they do their 
chores, whereas men see in their home a place to 
withdraw after work, view television and relax, a 
place to play with kids and be with friends and a 
place to keep one's material possessions. It also 
concluded that most home layouts were created by 
male architects and afforded men's home uses more 
so than women's. Notwithstanding that the very 
act of asking these questions may have made 
interviewees aware of the phenomenon being 
addressed, notwithstanding also the preference of 
scientific "findings" to emphasize large frequencies 
(majorities), commonalties and averages at the 
expense of exceptions or deviations from main 
findings, when such scientific reports become 
instructions to architects to develop layouts appro-
priate to women's ((needs", then past sexual 
stereotypes are being reinforced, establish them-
selves as norms and become built into the solid 
layouts of a home whose "forcing functions" might 
make it less and less possible for women to escape. 
Obviously, even innocent descriptions never are 
entirely neutral. The semiosis that Flade's insight-
ful "report" encourages has the potential of unin-
tentionally reinforcing the appalling sexual stereo-
types whose observation motivated the study. A 
lesson of this example could be to report not the 
facts as "found" but what this study could give rise 
to when embodied in the practice of living in 
architectural spaces. It serves here as an adequate 
demonstration that semioticians, through their 
inquiries into the meanings of others, are them-
selves involved in a semiosis that constructs and 
hence changes the very reality they seek to describe 
so innocently. Objectivists are committed to 
render nothing other than accurate descriptions and 
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are thereby prevented from understanding the self-
reference of their own practice. 
Without claiming to know the right way, I am 
afraid, the objectivist road might lead to a "semi-
otized world" full of problems and contradictions 
that may leave little space for alternatives and to 
feel at home. Let me therefore retract from the 
road commonly travelled to where a smaller path 
branched of and continue in a radically different 
direction. 
The trail worth blazing: towards a 
constructivist semantics 
l have to be brief now. Let me therefore demand, 
foremost of myself and with implicit justification 
taken from the preceding, that: 
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I Semantics, as a theoretical discourse on 
meaning, be embedded in human understanding as 
a recursive cognitive process. Humans should be 
recognized as constitutive participants in the worlds 
any semantic theory may construct. 
II My understanding and, hence, also the 
semantics I am concerned with here, must embrace 
(leave space for and take account oO others' under-
standing of the social practices through which we 
might be concerned with each other. Semantics 
arises out of social practices, informs them in return 
and therefore must be valid for observers and for 
observed others alike. 
III On the premise that understanding always is 
someone's self-reflective achievement and never fin-
ished as such, semantics should be creative and con-
structive of further understanding and enable the 
construction of coherent worlds, the design of 
meaningful artifacts and discourse presumed 
understandable by others included. 
3 
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It would follow that such a semantics must spell 
out the cognitive operations of understanding it is 
intrinsically concerned with. It should not desig-
nate a class of objects of interest, for example signs, 
but the cognitive processes that brings them into 
being. Let me mention a few processes a construc-
tivist semantics should embrace. 
Understanding 
to me, understanding is a recursive process of constructing (deconstructing, reconstructing and inventing) 
(reality) constructions whose cognitive unfolding 
(into various practices, interventions and actions) 
preserves the very process of construction within 
the experiences of its embodiment. Let me 
elaborate on some of its properties. 
Understanding is a cognitively autonomous 
process. It arises within individual cognition. It is 
personal and private. It can be neither transmitted 
to someone else nor imposed from the outside. 
(Any uinfluence" is a matter of one's own causal 
constructions on how different experiences are 
connected, how one chooses to explain them). 
Understanding is not ofsomething outside, under-
standing is, ongoing, a process. The eigenvalue of 
understanding (where the process converges to with 
time) may be the feeling that one's reality construc-
tions are coherent, sufficiently complete and viable 
in practice. 
Understanding is a recursive process. As such it 
builds on its own products, piles explanations on 
top of explanations, continuously decomposes, 
reconstructs, elaborates and transforms the con-
structions already there, weaving concurrent experi-
ence into them. "Original" or "raw'' experiences, 
which are hardly accessible as such, recede with 
time in their importance for directing the process. 
Understanding is a creative and constructive under-
taking. Reality constructions therefore happen by 
invention, not by necessity. This is far from saying 
that understanding is arbitrary. Understanding di-
rects its own history and is constrained by experi-
ences arising from its unfolding constructions into 
(social) practices and by contingencies (perturba-
tions) from its embodiment. It is within these con-
straints that its artifacts may arise spontaneously. 
If understanding were structure-determined and in-
dividuals would therefore have no choice in how 
they construct their realities, a sense of self could 
not arise and nobody could be held responsible for 
their actions. If understanding were totally arbi-
trary, wit\lOut a viability check, individuals would 
have to be solipsists and as such unable to respect, 
live and communicate with others like them. Thus, 
the notion of understanding here proposed may be 
nothing more than a creative perpetuation of social-
ly viable constructions. 
Understanding defines its own horizon. What is 
within seems coherent and meaningful, what is be-
yond escapes comprehension (or may not be seen at 
all). The horizon may expand, of course, with ex-
periences and in time, but only from within. For 
exan1ple, as it directs its own history, understanding 
also provides the passing contexts (of reality 
constructions) for perturbations to enter. However, 
the causes of these experiences cannot be known 
outside of understanding or constructing them-
which would keep them inside that horizon. For 
any one individual, there can therefore be no reali-
ty, no (social) practice independent of his or her 
understanding. 
Understanding dedicates all of its processes, all of 
its resulting reality constructions (including the 
construction of an observing self, others, a physical 
world and its horizon) to the preservation of under-
standing (coincidentally including its embodiment, 
for example, in the medium of a biological system 
which may remain unknown as such). One could 
also say, the purpose of understanding is to sustain-
ing itself in the face of perturbations arising from 
its embodiment.' Alternatively, it could be said 
that cognitive systems are constituted or constitute 
themselves to sustain their recursive understanding 
including themselves. Or, as Spencer-Brown con-
cluded, "we cannot escape the fact that the world 
we know is constructed in order (and thus in such a 
way as to be able) to see itself' (1972, p.105). 
Understanding and (social) practice belong to dif-
ferent phenomenal domains, to different realities. 
Anyone's (participation in social) practice is insepa-
rably fused and hence indistinguishable from his or 
her own self-understanding. Observing and seeking 
to understand the practices in which others partici-
pate involves seeking to understand the understand-
ing by others. One's own understanding and some-
one else's understanding have different embodi-
ments and therefore belong to different realities. 
Particularly in the social domain, understanding 
embraces different realities (or variously embodied 
reality constructions). 
Social practices, coordinations, institutions and 
other artifacts are correlates of the cognitive unfold-
ing of simultaneously active reality constructions. 
"Correlates)) because they may reach into and in-
volve the participation of others, but what anyone 
knows or what anyone knowingly acts upon always 
resides inside his or her own understanding. 
With this understanding of understanding in mind, 
let me develop a few concepts for a constructivist 
semantics. 
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Position 
the distinction between my understanding and my ef-fort to understand a social practice in terms of 
someone else's understanding gives rise to different 
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positions one may take within one's own reality 
constructions. For example, in communication 
research, one may want to distinguish between the 
position of the author and the positions of different 
kinds of readers vis-a-vis that of the communication 
researcher who links both through a text. The text 
may be something entirely different for each. To 
capture this difference (without privileging one's 
own reading as right and evetyone else's as wrong 
or biased in degrees) requires the ability to take 
different positions. T airing different positions from 
which to construct and see something that may 
appear to us to be the same for everybody enables 
choices among alternative constructions of reality 
and accordingly requires talting responsibilities for 
constructing them. 
Objectivist knowledge is positionless. Indeed, the 
belief in the existence of a single reality outside its 
observer, a universe, which is the same for every-
one, renders alternative positions meaningless. 
What is seen then is projected onto this outside 
reality for which no one can be held responsible 
except for having to accurately describe it. In this 
belief, alternative forms of understanding become 
human failures or distortions of reality. 
Minimally, positions are evident in our describing 
what we see (the people in our lives or the artifacts 
we handle) relative to our body. Someone is a 
father, an employee or an idol to me or to someone 
else but not necessarily to both. "Hard" and "soft" 
are defined relative to our experiences of touch. 
Whether we talk about people or computers, either 
has a front, facing us, and a back, facing away from 
us. And when we describe the functionality of 
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artifacts we refer to what we are able or unable to 
do with them, whether they help or hinder us. 
Thus, our self is intricately involved in how we see 
even the most elementary things. Helga and Hans-
Jtirgen Lannoch (1989) used this natural self-
reference in ordinary language descriptions of form 
to argue for a non-geometric notion of space that 
includes the position of the observer. 
The situation is more complicated when we have 
reasons to believe that what we are seeing from our 
position has positions of its own and different from 
us, when we do not merely observe but observe the 
observing by others. This is the key to understand-
ing human communication. In human communi-
cation, the cognitive autonomy of others, including 
their ability to choose positions of their own must 
be mutually respected else interaction ceases to be 
social and reduces to manipulating others as tools. 
However, I do not want to get into issues of 
communication here. Instead, I want to elaborate 
on the earlier question of what it takes to under-
stand someone else's meaning {of something), 
which is the prototypical question semantic 
analyses should answer. If we say we see only 
meanings, as Neisser suggests, or affordances, as 
Gibson claims, or the experiential consequences of 
the embodiments of our own reality constructions, 
then such positionless statements as "the lion is a 
symbol of protection,'' ((red means danger11 or "the 
airodynamic shape of a car indicates its speed" 
would not make sense without knowing who is 
talking. {For this reason, I argued that 
Ftiedlander's promulgations are Friedlander's ac-
count of Friedlander's perceptions, unjustifiably 
projected onto everybody else). As soon as we 
speak about others with cognitive capabilities simi-
lar to our own then we can no longer insist that 
others respond to how we see things. We have to 
respect their own understanding. Thus, asserting 
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what something means for others constitutes a rela-
tionship between constructions on different logical 
levels: our understanding and our construction of 
someone else's understanding. It entails that we ac-
knowledge our own position from which we see {or 
understand) and to construct from this vety posi-
tion the positions of others from which we have 
reasons to suspect they see {or understand) differ-
ently. In a constructivist semantics taking positions 
and appreciating (by construction) the positions 
others take is critical. 
I might add here in passing a distinction, proposed 
elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1990b) among three 
kinds of positions, that of a becomer, of an observer 
and of a subject. In the area of semantics, becomers 
realize their own semiosis and are involved in a 
continuous process of self-realization. Becomers are 
aware of malting themselves at home in their own 
understanding. Observers are aware of their ability 
to construct and reconstruct signs, symbols and 
artifacts outside themselves but not that this could 
apply to their own position and to themselves. De-
signers are prone to talting this position. Subjecrs 
see themselves as having to adapt and therefore 
willingly subject themselves to realities constructed 
as residing outside their participation and control, 
for example, to fixed meanings, unquestionable 
linguistic conventions, unalterable social 
institutions and super-individual powers. Subjects 
allow themselves to be oppressed by how they 
choose to see. 
The ability to take positions is fundamental to 
understanding ones own understanding. The 
ability to construct the positions of others is 
fundamental to understanding social practices. A 
constructivist semantics has to explain the differ-
ences created in talting different positions and in 
this difference might lie the fundamental notion of 
a sign. 
Metaphor 
0 bjectivists have little analytical use for metaphors, 
variously describing them syntactically as literary 
figures of speech, semantically as malting vague or 
allusory references and pragmatically as forms of 
poetic embellishment and all along blaming them 
for inconclusive thinking. To me, metaphors, 
while manifest in certain linguistic figures or visual 
forms, reflect a very precious cognitive operation. 
Metaphors seem vague and uncertain only when 
one is destined to look for referents outside 
cognition. 
Roughly, "metaphors make us see one thing in 
terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 
Lakoff, 1987). They become manifest in changing 
our perceptions. More specifically, there always are 
(1) two distinct domains of experiences, (2) a struc-
ture, pattern or principle of construction is trans-
ferred or carried from one (and usually well under-
stood) domain into another (and usually inade-
quately understood) domain which it thereby (3) 
organizes in ways not experienced or seen without 
this import. The latter involves fitting existing 
parts from the target domain into new wholes. 
Once the imported structure makes sense (4) meta-
phors serve as a bridge for bringing a variety of ad-
ditional entailments to the target domain. Two ex-
amples will suffice. 
People use all kinds of nonprescription drugs for all 
kinds of reasons. In the U.S., the complex web of 
motivations for drug production, dissemination 
and use is increasingly understood through war 
metaphors. Although there are other ways of 
understanding drug use, for example, as a disease 
(medical metaphor), as a community or educational 
issue (social metaphor) or as criminal behavior 
(legal metaphor), accounts of"the war on drugs" by 
politicians, the media and ordinary folks make it 
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into a battleground. Whereas a medical metaphor 
entails treatment and care for the diseased, the war 
metaphor entails a distinction between friends and 
foes, brings forth and mobilizes resources to fight 
the enemy, justifies even the invasion of another 
country, Panama as it were, calls for personal 
sacrifices, winning or losing being the only out-
comes. Metaphors are not true or false. They 
organize perceptions and actions through their 
terms. 
Another example is the shape of personal comput-
ers. There is no natural form. The boxes of a main-
frame computer are as good as the human figure of 
a fictional robot. Since the working of a computer 
is understandable only to very few, it is not surpris-
ing that personal computers assumed the shape of 
two familiar technologies, the TV screen for seeing 
and the keys of a typewriter for inputting. These 
two metaphors provided an initial understanding of 
computation in terms of what was well known in 
entirely different domains. However, they also 
drove their evolution. The first PC's had line 
screens. The user saw his or her outputs not much 
different from how it came out ofa typewriter, line 
by line and moving up the screen. But TV also 
shows colors which were added to computers as a 
matter of course. TV alsohas moving images and 
sound which are now being realized in various 
hyper-card applications. So, the entailments of the 
TV metaphor drives computer development within 
the horizon of understandability. 
From the point of view of a constructivist seman-
tics, metaphors are far from representations that are 
plagued by referential ambiguity and falsehood. 
Underlying their linguistic expression are rather 
definite cognitive operations that create new per-
ceptions and organize actions, render meaningful 
what heretofore was incomprehensible and consti-
tute new realities we thereafter observe with surptis-
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ing certainty . .N[etaphors reflect a cognitive process 
that creates new meanings. 
Metonymy: sense and function 
metonymy reflects the cognitive operation of relating 
parts to wholes. It explains or overcomes the differ-
ence created by drawing a distinction between 
something and wherein it resides, what it is a part 
of, the background against which it comes to the 
fore, for example, between inside and outside, be-
tween text and context, bet\veen an organism and 
its environment and between the observer and the 
observed. Clearly, neither wholes nor parts (which 
are wholes in their own right) can exist without the 
two cognitive operations of drawing part-whole 
distinctions and making sense of what keeps the 
thus created parts together. Elsewhere 
(Krippendorff, 1988, 1990a), I suggested a 
distinction between me:i'ning and sense, describing 
them as the result of two different operations on 
experiences. We say that something makes seme 
when we understand the role it plays in a particular 
context, when we have a metonymic understanding 
of what we see it does. It makes sense that the 
movement of a pen over paper leaves a mark. It 
makes sense that a bolt holds two pieces of hard-
ware together. In contrast, the meaning of some-
thing is the sum total of all the contexts for which 
we are able to imagine a sense for it. My pen does 
not just write, it can serve me in numerous capaci-
ties for example, to operate my computer wrist-
watch. In short, something means (or enables 
someone to anticipate and see) its possible contexts of 
use. Thus, by analogy, sense is to meaning as 
actuality is to potentiality, as performance is to 
competence (Chomsky) or as speech is to language 
(Saussure). We acquire sense by perception and 
action. We acquire meaning by grouping the many 
senses we could make (of something) in different 
settings into a recognizable class. I have frequencly 
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argued that design is making sense (of things) (Krip-
pendorff, 1989, 1990a). It calls for designing 
meaningful things, artifacts whose workings are 
understandable in particular contexts and by pro-
spective users. 
Metonymy probably reflects the cognitive prerequi-
site of objectivist notions of sign. For example, for 
a cause to become an index of its consequence (or 
for a consequence to indicate its cause) presupposes 
(1) drawing a distinction in time and in kind 
between two events and (2) explaining the differ-
ence thus created in causal terms. Only after these 
cognitive operations were performed on the initially 
undifferentiated and whole experience, can one 
event serve as an index of the absent other. Classi-
cal examples of metonymies are taking a crown as a 
sign for a monarchy, using (the image oO a table 
setting as the sign for a restaurant, making a logo 
designate a corporation (e.g. by imprinting it on 
every communication, building or product). 
Helene Karmasin10, gives several good examples of 
efforts to change the definition of products by 
presenting them in new contexts for TV viewers to 
-make sense of, for example, deodorants in the 
context of romantic success or expensive cat food in 
the context of treating someone special, the cat, for 
gi~ing invaluable companionship. The aim of this 
form of advertising is to create metonymies that 
encourage viewers to make sense that can be gener-
alized to a belief in buying, not a mere chemical 
that removes odors, but a means to interpersonal 
success or not mere food to feed a cat but a way of 
cultivating companionship. 
Metonymy also underlies functional analyses, 
ranging from the social sciences to engineering. 
Sociology, for example, defines the function of an 
individual act by how it contributes to the well-
being (essential prerequisites) of a society. In social 
psychology, social roles are described by the func-
tion a person performs by virtue of holding an of-
fice, position or title within a social organization. 
In systems theory, the function of a subsystem is 
what it does relative to all other parts of the larger 
system, mathematically expressed by an equation 
relating inputs to outputs. 
Being serious about the possibility of talting 
different positions within one's own reality con~ 
structions, I am suggesting that a fimction is 
nothing other than the disembodied sense something 
makes in a professionally privileged context. "Dis-
embodied" because it surrenders one's own position 
to a virtual community or group defined by the 
presumption of sharing a discourse, seeing alike or 
malting the same sense of things. "Privileged" be-
cause the context in which functions arise is not 
necessarily accessible to the experiences of the 
uninitiated and the theory that informs what a 
function is arises from what that professional 
community considers desirable and real. In design, 
the functional description of artifacts privileges the 
metonymic constructions of professional designers. 
Witness the frequent discussions about what a 
product's functions should be and complaints 
about users who do not use it as intended. In 
semiotics, sign-functions privilege the metonymic 
constructions of semioticians. All speech commu-
nities tend to privilege their own functional 
discourses. For example, an AI engineer may 
consider the functional architecture of a computer 
as the only reality that counts and user conceptions 
as secondary, subjective and unreal, whereas a user 
may see that computer primarily as a device for 
acquiring a competitive advantage over others, 
rendering the senses made by others less important. 
Similarly, when designers get excited about an 
unusual artifact, their professional discourse 
prevents them from analyzing their emotions and 
instead places such an artifact in the context of 
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socially established aesthetic theories which justify 
arguing in terms of proportions, symmetries, repeti-
tions, etc., not realizing that this way of seeing is 
rather specialized to their profession. 
Sense and functions arise out of the same meto-
nymic processes but differ in the responsibilities 
taken or refused for what is seen. 
Polysemy: meanings and affordances 
by accounting for meanings, for example, in terms of contents of containers as in "X has the meaning of 
'f' or in terms of correspondences as in "X 
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substitutes for Y/' objectivist semiotics favors one-
to-one relationships. Dictionaries, catalogues of 
symbols and codes describing such relationships are 
witness to these preferences and when such one-to-
one descriptions cannot be achieved, contexts are 
sought out as disambiguating agents. This is 
merely an effort to rule out polysemy. Consider a 
few examples of uses of the word "play:" 
to play tennis 
to play down an issue 
to play something in someone else's hands 
to play around with someone of the opposite sex 
to play a game of chess 
a play by Shakespeare 
child's play 
playboy magazine 
a playboy 
"play" plays different roles in different contexts 
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In these examples, there seem to be few if any com-
monalties among the senses in which «play" deci-
sively participates. It would therefore be difficult to 
claim the word to have a core meaning that differ-
ent contexts merely modifY (see synecdoche below). 
"Play" simply is polysemous which is to say that it 
can assume a range of roles in different situations. 
The only constancy in these examples is the word 
"play." 
In view of the chamelion-like senses something can 
make in different contexts, the semiotic ideal of 
finding simple correspondences between sign-
vehicles and what they refer to or mean, also 
expressed in the apparent need for disambiguation, 
may be a hopeless if not oppressive undertaking, 
save for the most restricted semantic domains, for 
example, traffic signs, legal terms, technical vocabu-
lary, military ranks and dictionaries used in teach-
ing. In fact, in all of the latter examples there are 
institutional reasons for forcing unambiguous 
use. What is needed here is some kind of field 
theory of meaning. 
In the preceding, I defined sense as an explanation 
of what something is seen as actually daing in a 
particular context of experiences, the role it plays 
for someone, and meanings as the roles something 
could play or what it could be made to da in a range 
of imaginable contexts. So, a pen is not just an 
instrument for writing. It can also be a pointer, a 
stylus, a projectile, a book mark, a reason for holes 
in one's pocket, a fingernail cleaner, a gift, a status 
symbol, a sales item, an expense, something to hold 
a women's hair in a knot, etc. Although some uses 
of a pen, may be more typical than others, the word 
'lplay" does not seem to have a single most out-
standing sense. When Neisser suggests we see 
meanings, not stimuli or things, this would entail 
that we see in a chair the possibility of our sitting 
on it, moving it, stapling it, etc., or that we see in a 
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Porsche the possibility of driving fast, impressing 
someone else, etc. This is not to suggest that we al-
ways have in mind all the culturally conceivable con-
t~xts of use for what meets our senses, but that the 
meaning ofsornething equals our present anticipation 
of what we could da with it, in which contexts it 
would make sense to us. Meanings always are relative 
to someone's circumstances of understanding. 
A concept closely related to this notion of meaning 
is affordance. Gibson (1979, 1982) originally 
coined the term to account for his observation that 
pilots, seeking to land their aircraft, look for and see 
in the surfaces they are exposed to not what it is but 
whether an aircraft is "landable." He extended this 
idea to perception in general, suggesting that 
something becomes a chair because it is perceived as 
affording sitting, that something becomes a cup 
because it is seen as affording the containment of 
fluids, etc. Gibson certainly was an objectivist or 
realist as he described himself who believed that it is 
the nature of the perceived object that provides in-
formation and does the affording. This led him to 
disembodied accounts analogue to that of functions 
as discussed above but, unlike the objectivism of his 
period, his affordances clearly are anticipatory and 
describe abilities or potentialities. Gibson's 
affordances seem to be nothing but meanings except 
that they are disowned by their beholders, projected 
on a perceived environment outside of them, and 
presumed shared by members of a {professional) 
community of psychologists and designers, for 
example. Thus, affordances are to meanings as 
fimctions are to sense. 
With this terminology in place, differences in 
constructions and perceptions between professional 
designers as a community and individual users {or 
others involved in the cycle of production and con-
sumption) of artifacts become assailable and 
questions about what a depersonalized object {as 
seen by designers) may mean to particular users can 
be answered. One could say, designers, like good 
communicators, engage in discursive practices 
through the articulation of artifacts whose mean-
ings for particular users must also be afforded by 
them else a user will approach his or her environ-
ment with expectations that are bound to fail 
(Krippendorff, 1989). However, to state such a 
relationship between affordances and meanings, as 
in the previous sentence, requires a relativistic un-
derstanding of different individuals', understanding 
including one's own. This relativity withdraws the 
objectivity from Gibsons claims and makes the very 
difference between affordances and meanings of 
prime interest to a semantics for designers. It also 
shifts the aim of design from creating aesthetic 
forms of products to providing those affordances 
that enable ordinary users to understand their 
artifacts in their own way and to engage with them 
in socially desirable practices (ultimately with the 
designers as well). 
Thus, a constructivist semantics must recognize 
polysemy as a normal case, not as the undesirable 
exception. It should look for meanings in the 
multitude of contexts someone is capable of 
constructing for something to make sense. It has to 
relativise such meanings by taking into account 
different positions, particularly comparing one's 
own understanding with understanding of someone 
else's understanding of what either may understand 
quite differenrly. To reduce object-meaning 
relationships to one-to-one correspondences or 
codes, like purporting the lion to be a symbol of 
protection, suppresses the very scope of under-
standing a constructivist semantics seeks to provide. 
Synedoche: types and tokens 
Qften confused with metonymy, synecdoche reflects the 
cognitive operation of relating (not parts to wholes 
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but) species to genera, tokens to types, objects to 
categories, etc. It is the process by which we identi-
fY what something is, to which category it belongs 
which underlies the linguistic notion of connota-
tion. It enables the naming of something not pre-
viously experienced by relating it to a familiar type. 
Objectivists define categories in terms of what all 
the instances of a category or the elements of a set 
have in common.u This most naturally leads to 
logical taxonomies of downwardly increasing 
commonalties. The elaborate classification systems 
of signs in semiotics provide ample examples of the 
consequence of such a definition. 
Constructivist semantics relies instead on the 
cognitive operations that invoke identifYing and 
categorizing experiences. It defines categories not 
by boundaries but by their center, often called 
prototype, ideal type or type for short. The 
evidence in favor of the latter is strong and has a 
considerable history. There is Wittgenstein's 
(1958) concept of family resemblance according to 
which a category of things need not be represented 
by what they all have in common but by the con-
nectivity among its members. There is Chomsky's 
argument that we cannot learn a language by being 
exposed to all sentences of that language for we 
construct new ones all the time and understand 
even ungrammatical sentences with ease. 
There is Rosh's (1978) work on prototypes suggest-
ing that we can far easier express how close some-
thing is to what is most typical of a category, its 
prototype, than to draw a boundary around all 
members. 
Athavankar (1989, 1990) explored categorization 
and prototype theory for design in which the iden-
tification of something is an important issue when 
marketing an entirely new product or redesigning a 
familiar artifact. The boundaries between a cup, a 
1 
T]' 
.. ' 
mug and a bowl may be fuzzy but the ideal- (or 
proto-) type is dear for any one user. Jochen Gros 
once described the type of a category of artifacts as 
its "Wesen12)) or essence. 
Recently Johnson (1987) suggested that meaning 
forms a category as well, connecting a multitude of 
contexts that may have nothing in common other 
than that the same thing links the different senses it 
participates in into a single category, the category of 
the artifact. One could argue that anything seen 
always already is an artifact of cognition by virtue 
of meaningful prototypes available for ir. 
Cognitive models: schemas and 
scripts 
when we approach a new experience, we always bring 
to it a repertoire of patterns for understanding, 
structures that have guided the coordination of per-
ception and action in the past, maps we have availa-
ble to walk in similar terrain, scripts we are accus-
tomed to follow, often without much thinking. 
These phenomena may be captured here by a 
single concept. To me, a cognitive model is a 
recurrent pattern that recursively connects experiences 
and maps then into tmderstandin&so that we may 
reason with them. Let me elaborate. 
Basic schemas, like cause and effect, map and 
territory, sign and referent, text and context, 
actor-action-targets and the semiotic triangle al-
ready are cognitive models, albeit simple and 
general ones. These organize many experiences 
semioticians have as evident in semiotic discourses. 
What is important here is that cognitive models 
are capable of organizing, reconstructing and 
generating far more complex experiences than 
these, from driving a car to understanding 
how to move through a political system. 
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Cognitive models are neither about nor representa-
tive of objects or systems of objects outside of us. 
One can think of them as guiding particular social 
practices we wish to engage in. These bring forth 
experiences that inform the cognitive models in use 
and thus dose a circle that constitutively involves 
an - without these models unknowable -
environment. Within what such an environment 
affords, cognitive models entail their own limita-
tions. They work or remain viable as long as their 
unfolding into social practices does not create 
difficulties for themselves or end up in a 
breakdown or trap. 
However, having said that understanding, our 
cognitive models included, has no knowable 
outside referent, we nevertheless can study the 
cognitive models held by others in our own 
understanding and compare them with our own 
constructions of the practice they inform. This 
seems possible because our ability to reason with 
them and to express them in verbal discourse. For 
example, Kempton (1987) carefully analyzed the 
verbal accounts given by different users of thermo-
static home heat control devices and could con-
struct from them what seemed to be the guiding 
conceptions of the practices he could observe. 
Kempton found that individuals approached 
thermostats either with the cognitive model of a 
valve or with the cognitive model of a feedback 
loop. Those guided by the valve model caused more 
extreme temperature differences, had to reset the 
thermostat more frequently and experienced more 
frustrations than those guided by the feedback 
model. The material system afforded both cognitive 
models, of course, but brought forth rather differ-
ent experiences for their beholders. The fact that 
there are engineers who know the system they con-
structed does not enter the experiences of either 
kind of users who saw no reason to change their 
conceptions. 
The for practical purposes absence of correspond-
ence criteria for evaluating cognitive models is most 
striking in the design of user interfaces for comput-
ers. The interior of a computer is virtually incom-
prehensible to most competent users. Within the 
extremely wide confines afforded by a computer, 
users have the freedom to develop their own and 
often rather weird conceptions of how the comput-
er does what is experienced and in turn use those 
conceptions that worked to generate experiences 
that would follow from them. These conceptions 
often come from entirely different domains of 
experiences (see metaphors) and computer interface 
designers may take advantage of cognitive models 
in use to design operations that afford them. For 
example, by affording opening and storing fLies, 
discarding documents in a waste basket which have 
little to do with what the computer does but much 
with schemas of human understanding. Turkle 
(1984) analyzed the cognitive models of computers 
in children and traced their epigenesis to experi-
ences with videogames, smart toys and human 
interactions. Johnson (!987) looked for even mote 
basic sources of schemas like inside-outside, up-
down, front-back, toward-away from, that are 
thought to come from early bodily experiences, are 
expressed in language and underly the construction 
of many cognitive models for creating the world we 
come to believe we live in. 
The understanding of meaning is to a significant 
degree informed by an understanding of the 
cognitive models in use and discourse probably is 
the best window into their cognitive constructions. 
Cognitive models cannot be showed aside as 
"mere" conceptual. They are demonstrably real. 
lnteractivity: semiosis and involvement 
as a final point, I am suggesting that a constructivist se-
mantics would have to embrace change as a consti-
OBJECTS AND IHAGES 4 
tutive principle of understanding. Mainstream 
semiotics' self-imposed aim to describe the world in 
terms of binary relationships as enshrined in the 
semiotic triangle not only limits the complexity of 
the phenomena it is led to tackle but also betrays 
what probably motivated its originators, Charles S. 
Peirce for example, to initiate the project, and this 
is semiosis, the process by which signs come to be, 
semiogenesis if you wish. Inquiries into relation~ 
ships presupposes they exist as such and looking for 
codes makes one find them in the stabilities of a 
world that resists variation. In this kind of semiot-
ics, semiosis reduces to learning established signs, 
adapting to existing conventions and institutions 
and supporting the status quo. A theme that ran 
through much of this paper is that cognition is 
inherently restless. People's understanding not 
merely adapts but creates social practices. There are 
many realities, not one, and these are constantly 
taken apart and constructed anew when we cogni-
tively or discursively attend to them. Asserting 
something, like producing an artifact, always chang-
es the world we live in, albeit by small measures. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the already 
mentioned world of modern personal computers. 
Computers are general purpose machines to start 
out with on which hardware designers impose a 
simple architecture that users cannot change. 
Beyond this, there is a whole industry that competi-
tively provides software for malting computers 
more understandable to users. Software links the 
computer designers' understanding of how a system 
works to users' understanding of the same. It is by 
traditional definitions a mechanism of communica-
tion between the two, but of a qualitative new kind. 
The critical feature of such a mechanisms is not to 
influence, to control or to enforce a particular 
behavior, but to enable users, senders or receivers, to 
do something with and in terms of their very own 
understanding. 
3 
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By comparison, traditional machines essentially are 
trivial in structure, embodying particular input-
output relations.~' They are conceived as tools 
whose specialized use has to be learned and perfect-
ed. They force users to adapt to them. The 
motivation for their employment largely derives 
from achieving certain goals outside of them to 
which these machines are means. Personal com put-. 
ers may be used as tools as well but, more impor-
tantly, they can be made to perform innumerable 
tasks, are within an enormous range configurable 
and can therefore be tailored by and in support of 
human understanding. This makes them more 
adapting to users' cognition than the other way 
around. The motivation for their use comes less 
from extrinsic achievement but from intrinsic 
involvement in the process of unfolding ones 
cognition in interactive practices. The more 
natural it feels, the more self-directed one can move 
and the more open to meaningful alternatives a 
comPuter is, the more fun it is to interact if not 
play with it. The evolution from word processors 
to Macintosh windows to hyper-media applications 
and to virtual realities is semiosis at its best. 
Science always had an affinity to technology, 
sometimes using it as a testbed for its theories and 
sometimes talting from it models and metaphors for 
constructing its theories. It seems that we have to 
move away from the objectivist vocabulary of icons, 
codes, causal chains and binary relations, away from 
reprensentational and instrumental conceptions of 
language and away from the search for accurate de-
scriptions, predictions and control, all of which are 
so clearly tied to trivial machine conceptions. The 
artifactual world we now experience has grown far 
beyond our traditional horizon of understanding. 
We have to catch up to lead its ongoing semiosis. 
Modern computers do not provide the only 
metaphors for what a constructivist semantics 
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should be concerned with. Interactive practices of 
deconstruction, reconstruction and designing social 
realities in which participants understanding thrives 
in cooperation with each other, creating institu-
tional processes in which new realities are envision~ 
ed and put into praxis and the very effort of con-
structing a constructivist semantics for the design of 
meaningful artifacts among others, product seman-
tics for short, a semantics that brings forth the phe-
nomena it claims to be about, these provide ample 
examples of semiotic practices that could provide 
their own metaphors of understanding. 
Let me conclude with the quote from a magician of 
our trade who, through his own "looking glass/' 
may have anticipated much of what I was propos-
ing here by having his characters engaged in this 
dialogue: 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty 
said, in rather a scornful tone 
"it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less.)) 
'(The questipn is," said Alice, , 
"whether you can make words mean so 
many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, 
"which is to be master that's all." 
(Lewis Carroll, 1982:184) 
My answer would have to be found not in the 
authority of a semiotician but in the constructions 
we must create by ourselves to live in. 
Klaus Krippendorff 
Ph.D., is Professor of Communication 
at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, USA. 
--'----------- See a special issue of the Industrial Designers Society of America's 
magazine, Innovations, 3, 2, 1984; a special double issue of Design Issues, 
2 
5, 2, 1989; the Proceedings from the Product Semantics '89 Conference, 
Seppo Viikeva (ed.). Publication of the University of Industrial Arts UIAH, 
A4, Helsinki, 1990. 
For example Ernst von Glasersfeld's (1984) radical constructivism, Kenneth 
Gergen's (1985) social constructionism, Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann's Social Construction of Reality (1967), George Lakoff (1987) and 
Mark Johnson's ( 1987) cognitivism and various shades of naive 
constructivisms ranging from George Kelly (1955) to Jesse Delia (1977). 
_.=J__________ The difficulty of applying correspondence truth criteria also came to light 
in a recent talk by Thomas Sebeok on "virtual reality," a computer-
generated interactive world providing virtually real experiences to users. 
He grounded the uncertainty regarding what reality is in conclusions ra-
tionally derived at by certain philosophers but then proceeded to 
distinguish between vi.rtual realities, simulations and other forms of 
representation as if an unqualified reality would knowably exist outside of 
us, as if the uncertainty as to how reality is constituted could be ignored in 
its representations. (See Proceedings of the 6th International Congress 
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on "Sign (Theory) in Practice", Passau, Germany, in press). 
In a recent article, Helga Lannoch and Hans-JUrgen Lannoch (1989) recog-
nize that the orthogonality of geometric space conceptions cannot accom-
modate human perception and developed instead a semantic notion of 
space whose attributes are relative to the position of the observer within 
this space. 
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_ _:5._ __________ An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690. 
-~6c_, __________ 6th International Congress "Sign(Theory) in Practice" Passau, Germany, 
October 8-11, 1990. Proceedings forthcoming. 
_ _,7 ___________ Helene Karmasln, "Mehrwert durch Zeichenwahl, Semiotik in der Analyse 
von Marketing und Werbung", Plenary presentation to the above men-
tioned Congress, Wednesday I 0-10-90. 
--=------------ Antje Flade, "Geschlechtsunterschied und Affordanz von Wohnungen", Pa-
per presented to the above mentioned Congress, Section 5, Okologie und 
Semiotik, Monday, I 0-8-90. 
--'----------- This formulation of understanding resembles that of autopoiesis which 
Humberto Maturana discussed in numerous publications and at the above 
mentioned Congress. This resemblance is no accident. Autopoiesis is an 
explanation of living systems as a recursive network of interactions that 
produces all the components necessary to continuously embody the very 
process that produces them. As an explanation, autopoiesis is a recent 
invention by Maturana and Varela ( 1980) and is not a requirement of 
anyone's understanding. However, in seeking to understand the (social) 
practices of others in terms of their understanding, since understanding 
cannot exist outside of its embodyment (in a circular network of 
perception and action constitutionally involving the biology of that other), 
the maintenance of a biological organization through self-production, 
which autopoiesis seeks to explain, is a prerequisite for understanding to 
take place. In the long run, understanding cannot contradict the 
autopoiesis of its embodyment. 
----'1-"0 ________ Ibid. 
-'-1 '-1 --------- See George Lakoff ( 1987) for a good discussion of this difference. 
12 Jochen Gros, Form, sometimes before 1984. 
13 For an elaboration of the trivial machine notion see H. von Foerster 
( 1984). 
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